The paper investigates whether low skilled male Albanians face unequal treatment in the Greek labour market, two years after the national adoption of the European antidiscrimination employment legislation. By means of a Correspondence Test we have estimated that Albanians face 43.5% net discrimination of access to occupations. Concentrating on the equal chance cases, we subsequently found that Albanians face 36.5% less chance of being registered with insurance coverage, while their potential wage contracts are on the average 8.8% below those of Greeks, and 5.3% below the legal minimum wage. As it comes to the reasons for wage discrimination, using an indirect approach we interestingly found that the employers themselves "put the blame" on profit strategies (84.4%), on statistical discrimination (9.6%), and on taste discrimination (7.8%).
Introduction
There is significant literature across social sciences, which analyzes discrimination in labour markets on the grounds of race and ethnicity. In Greece, however, little work has been done in measuring discrimination and what we do know comes mainly from national observatories. The scope of this paper is to measure the existence of racial discrimination in the Greek private market, two years after the national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment legislation (2005/3304) .
Racial/ethnic discrimination has been a particular focus of recent efforts by
European lawmakers, at least in part to the dramatic growth of racism in Europe following the end of Communism. We are particularly interested in investigating whether male Albanians 1 face discriminatory treatment in the labour market, compared to Greeks, and to evaluate whether stereotypes prejudice the Greek employers' screening processes.
Due to the absence of standardized economic data we employ the Correspondence Test method in order to isolate the ethnic discrimination trend for a specific period. The correspondence test is used for detecting discrimination in the preliminary stage of the selection process, which for the ethnic minorities is seen to be the most crucial barrier to the labour market. A typical correspondence test entails that the researcher sends two equal -in human capital-applications (CV's), to advertised job openings. The only characteristic that differs between the two (pseudo) applications is the ethnicity of the candidates. Ethnic discrimination is then measured by the difference in the number of call backs for interview between the two ethnic groups. The main advantage of this approach is that one can get direct measurements of the employers' attitudes 2 .
In our study we extend this test by gathering data concerning insurance coverage registrations to the Social Security Organization (IKA) as well as wage 1 It was not until the collapse of the communist Albanian government in 1991 that Greece experienced the first flows of immigration. Ten years later around the 60% of immigrants in Greece are from Albania (Greek Census, 2001 3 wage decomposition has been subject to considerable criticism as it is thought to be a biased method for discrimination tests 4 .
Thus, our study examines labour market discrimination by essentially using experimental data. Concentrating on low skilled workers our sample particularly refers to: (a) office jobs, (b) factory jobs, (c) café and restaurant services and (d) shop sales. Our findings provide strong evidence for discrimination against Albanians in all three dimensions. Albanians face 43.5% less chance of access to occupations. More interestingly, concentrating on the 49.7% equal chance cases of access to occupations, we found that Albanians face 36.5% less chance of being registered with insurance coverage, while their potential wage contracts are 8.8% below those of Greeks, and 5.3% below the legal minimum wage. Last, but not least, in order to evaluate the reasons for wage discrimination, we appealed to the most appropriate group to judge:
The employers who defined the outcome. Using an indirect method, we found that the factors contributing to wage inequality are the firms' profit strategies (accounting for the 84.4% of the total), followed by ambiguities concerning Albanians' productivity (9.6%), whilst a "dislike" against Albanians accounts only for the 7.8%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch out the phenomenon of ethnic discrimination in the European labour market, as well as the recent anti-discrimination legislation, and we briefly review the theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination. In the third section we report various forms of discriminatory contracts in the Greek labour market and we present the 3 Various economists have attempted to offer economic explanations for the phenomenon of ethnic discrimination in wages, drawing largely on the U.S. Black and White experiences (Altonji and Black, 1999; Cain, 1986; Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) . Regressions show that ethnic minority groups earn less than the majority native workers. 4 Wage decomposition combines the estimated coefficients for national wages and the values of the explanatory variables for ethnic workers. The criticism involves around the specifications of the model and the choice of independent variables. There is no conclusive proof of discrimination as long as all other possible relevant variables have not been identified (Bovenkerk, 1992) . model encapsulating our investigating relationships. In the fourth section we describe the methodology and the application structure of our investigation. In the fifth section we present and evaluate the field results of our correspondence test, regarding occupational access for Greek and Albanian workers, as well as regarding wage discrimination. In the sixth section we present the methodology, application, and results of our second experiment concerning the factors which account for wage discrimination.The last section concludes.
Ethnic Discrimination, Legislation, and Theoretical Explanations
Discrimination is complex, multifaceted and deeply ingrained in behaviour, and difficult to measure or quantify 5 . Discrimination is understood to exist when some superficial characteristic is used in an attempt to restrict individuals' access to the available economic, political, and social opportunities for advancement (D'Amico, 1987 The theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination are concerned with how and why productively irrelevant characteristics influence the labour market behavior of employers and workers (Swinton, 1977) . There is not, however, a generally accepted economic theory of discrimination, while there are a variety of reasons for it:
The taste hypothesis (Becker, 1957; 1971) envisions discrimination as a preference (or taste) for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In particular, the employers' taste for discrimination is based on the idea that they want to maintain a physical or social distance from certain groups. Employers are then willing to sacrifice profits, by paying higher wages than they need to, or by accepting workers less qualified than others they could recruit at the same wage. The trouble with this explanation is that it contradicts in a direct way the usual view of employers as profitmaximizers 10 .
The Marxist approach (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) views racism as a tactic used by employers to introduce class cleavages within the working class. Economic gain rather than psychic preference is then the main motive for discrimination. Wage discrimination simply pays in terms of maximizing profits. Jobs are organized to take wage advantage of ethnic workers, and the tactic is intended to minimize labour costs, 9 In particular, Directive 78 applies to a range of grounds, including racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation (regarding both the public and private sectors), in relation to: (a) Conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever is the branch of activity and the level of the professional hierarchy (including promotion by weakening the workers' bargaining position, or perhaps to stall the workerstemming long-run threat to the capitalistic system. Employers' well being is therefore improved as they are able to raise their expected incomes through discrimination.
The idea that competition may eventually eliminate discrimination led to the development of the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Arrow, 1972 (Arrow, , 1973 Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Clain, 1977) . Discrimination results from the profit maximizing response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers, while the real or subjective distributions favour the group which receives preferences.
Stereotyping plays the major role in this approach. Statistical models of discrimination predict that if employers perceive minorities as being generally less productive than majorities, and if it is difficult to measure the actual workers' productivity, then minorities with above-average productivity may receive belowaverage returns.
Finally, an alternative explanation for wage discrimination is more recently given, in a Union-Oligopoly context (Drydakis and Vlassis, 2006) . If union members possess different reservation wages, unions may offer to firms the option to discriminate firm-specific wages across equally-skilled employees and by that to achieve lower costs which lead to higher profits.
Uninsured Employment and Ethnic Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market

Various forms of discriminatory contracts
The main task of social security is to offer insurance coverage to its members through benefits. In Greece, compulsory insurance formally starts on the very first day of employment, in the country's largest Social Security Organization (IKA), which covers in general those in dependent employment. It meets the needs of its insured members in medical care and benefit payments, such as old age pensions, disability pensions, maternity aid, sickness-accident allowance etc.
Employee registration with IKA implies mandatory contribution payments for both the employer and the employee based on employee wage levels, which cannot be lower than the legal minimum wage in proportion to employee characteristics.
Uninsured employment or insured employment with inaccurate data constitute illegal treatment and are penalized by fines. In practice, however, illegal treatment takes the form of ″silent″ (or, tacit) agreements between employers and employees: Either employees agree to be registered with IKA only after they have certified their productiveness, or they are registered on condition that they have to deposit a fraction or the total employers' contributions to IKA for a period. In all cases, the employers exploit the employees' need for income, while firms' costs and employees' net receipts decrease with insurance contributions. Moreover, employees may be often registered as being less human-capital-endowed with less work experience and in general with few characteristics than they actually possess. Thereafter, wage level depends on the tacit agreement's terms. On the other hand, those employers who refuse to register employees have a wider range of discriminatory wage contracts to offer. Immigrants are hereby most affected, as they typically face higher statistical discrimination. 
Pair-wise Modeling
The above practices imply that ethnic (or other) discrimination in the Greek labour market may take various forms, while its reasoning seems to fit well with any of the profit maximization -compatible explanations reviewed in the previous section. Nonetheless, our field experiment investigates for all possible source of discrimination, as follows.
First, to allow for a taste for discrimination, we want to examine whether ethnicity affects an applicant's probability of receiving a job interview [ ]. To particularly measure whether Greek employers have a taste for discrimination against Albanians, following Neumark et al (1996) , we define the following relationship:
Where: P is the latente regression explaining the probability of receiving a job interview, and has a value of one (zero) when applicants receive an interview (otherwise); I refers to the interview stage; S refers to the sectors; a is the constant; β is the parameter of the ethnic variable; E refers to the ethnicity and has a value of one (zero) when the candidate is a Greek (Albanian); u is the disturbance term. We can estimate equation (1) 
Where B refers to the insurance coverage stage.
Last, but not least, we are interested in whether ethnicity affects employee wage offers. For that we analogously define the following relationship.
WhereW refers to the monthly wage offers and H refers to the wage offer stage.
Note that in all three equations no other control variables are necessary since the applicants are matched in all characteristics other than ethnicity.
Correspondence Test: Methodology and Application Structure
Methodology
Descending the seminal paper of Riach and Rich (2002) , different forms of field experiments have been used to test for discrimination in hiring. Due to their simplicity and controllability, these real-life experiments have become quite popular and they have been carried out in at least fifteen countries. In such an experiment, the term Correspondence Test particularly refers to the technique of written approaches for interview access to advertised vacancies 12 .
Our field experiment was conducted between May 2006 to January 2007 and the geographical parameters involved the major city of Greece, Athens. We had concentrated on low skilled vacancies, because 78% of male Albanians in Greece are low skilled (Greek Census, 2001 ). The four occupations to which we had focused on were: office jobs, factory jobs, café and restaurant services and shop sales. They have 12 There are two other procedures that had been previously used to measure the extent of discrimination in labour market. These methods involve personal approaches, in which individuals either apply over telephone (Brown and Gay, 1985; Hubbuck and Carter, 1980) or they attend job interviews (Daniel, 1968; McIntosh and Smith, 1974 At the first stage, the employer's response to an application was recorded as positive when the candidate was invited for an interview. The outcomes could be: (i) both applicants are invited for interview, (ii) only one is invited, and (iii) nobody is invited. If both applicants were invited they are considered to be treated equally. If neither was invited it could, at first sight, be recorded as equal treatment as well. Yet, in the literature, outcome (iii) is handled in two ways. Either it is considered to be a non-observation (Riach and Rich, 1987; 1991; Mc Intosh and Smith, 1974;  International Labour Organization), or it is recorded as an observation of equal treatment (Urban Institute, 1990; Neumark, 1996) . In our experiment we have followed the standardized ILO approach. Of course, in case (ii), where only one applicant was invited, a discriminatory attitude is observed.
At the second stage, the classification of insurance coverage registration offered could respectively entail three outcomes: both workers will be registered (with IKA), only one worker will be registered, neither will be registered. If both workers are offered registrations, they are considered as being equally treated. If neither will be registered it is considered as equal treatment, and if only one worker will be registered, a discriminatory attitude is observed.
As in turn regards the third stage, an employer's response could comprise of only two it may outcomes. Either both workers are offered equal wages, or the wage offers vary across ethnicities.
Application Structure
The vacancies in our four occupations were found in website newspapers. We applied to vacancies where there was a specific demand for low skilled male workers for, eight-hour and five-day, employment. The qualifications and presentation style of the two (pseudo) applicants were matched as closely as possible, so that they were identical in all employment relevant characteristics but ethnicity. In each application
we provided all the necessary information, to eliminate the possibility of statistical discrimination, at the preliminary stage of the hiring process. Each application was designed to equally convey the type of experience that might make an applicant attractive.
The fictitious applications consisted of a name and last name, a mobile telephone number, and a postal address. In the candidates' CVs there was a specific ethnicity reference. The addresses were chosen so that to be recognized as similar as candidates' high schools and previous workplaces were located at different areas in Athens. Similarly, the candidates had carried out military service in different areas.
Finally, both had similar hobbies/interests and personal characteristics. The styles of CVs and cover letters were, however, different for each pair. Whereas, in order to control for the possibility the style of an application to influence an employer's response, the application forms were allocated equally between the Greek and Albanian applicant. For the same reason, the applications were sent alternately to each vacancy. Of course, in all cases applications were sent from different fax numbers. In our case, the pattern outcome was always found to be in the same direction, i.e., the Greek favored proportion is always bigger than the Albanian favored proportion and we can thus reject symmetry (Table B , Appendix 1).
Field Results
Interview Invitation
Thereafter, we are interested in examining whether our four samples come from the same binomial population. Using pooled estimators, we have thus tested for, and accepted homogeneity, since: 13 We had first to examine whether the , and distributions are normal. We had therefore performed the -goodness of fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-and accepted the (null) hypothesis of normality ( (65.6%) equal treatment (net discrimination), which were the lower (higher) bounds across occupations: They respectively face 41.5% (50.6%), in shop sales, 53.4% (39.7%), in factory jobs, and 67.7% (24.1%), in restaurant and café services. Hence, regarding office vacancies, which can be considered as the white collar ingredient of our reference occupations, we may conclude that Albanians face higher occupational discrimination. However, regarding factory vacancies (which can be respectively seen as the blue collar occupation), Albanians seem to face higher net discrimination compared to restaurant and café vacancies.
Insurance Coverage Registration
At the second stage, discrimination is assigned whenever an employer refuses to register a potential employee with insurance coverage, on the first employment day. In Table 2 we report our relevant probability results. Column (1) shows that in 37.8% cases firms refused to inform whether they would register (with IKA), either one, or both, worker (s) . Column (2) As it comes to occupations, in office jobs Albanians faced the lowest net discrimination rate 16.6%, while that rate was 26.4% in factories, 50.0% in shop sales, and 54.1% in restaurant and café services. At the same time office jobs faced the highest equal treatment (83.3%), followed by factories (73.5%), restaurant and café services (45.8%), and shop sales (50.0%). Consequently, even in low skilled vacancies, more prestigious jobs entailed lower insurance coverage discrimination, even though Albanians faced lower occupational access there. Also, in factories where accident risk is higher, insurance coverage discrimination was, as expected, lower compared to restaurant-café services and shop sales.
Wage Offers
At the third stage we are interested in measuring differences in wages offered, across potential employees, and we similarly concentrate on the equal treatment outcomes assigned at the first stage. As it is reported in Table 3 , we found that Albanians receive monthly wage contracts 8.8% below those of Greeks: Employers are willing to pay the Greek (Albanian) candidate 641.06€ (584.04€). It therefore seems that an ethnic penalty, of 57.02€ per month, applies. In order to further evaluate our measurements, we subsequently compare the wages offered with the (legally binding) minimum wages, as the latter are defined by the National General Collective Employment Agreement (N.G.C.E.A.).
In Table 4 we present the minimum wages for unmarried employees and workers, in proportion to their work experience. Our candidates were unmarried and each had nine years of work experience. Minimum wage records were however As it can be noted from the last rows of Tables 3 and 4 , the mean wage offer for the Albanian candidates is found to be 5.3% below the no-experience minimum wage rate. Whilst, the Greek mean wage offer is found to fall between the noexperience and the three years of work-experience minimum wage rate. More importantly, we have estimated a variety of occupation-specific discrimination coefficients, ranging from 12.2%, in office jobs, to 6.0%, in restaurant and café services. Whilst, as our performed ANOVA F-statistic test assures, in all occupations the outcomes are found to be statistically significant at the 1% level (column 5 of Table 3 ).
Difference in Ethnic Mean Wages
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Regression Results
Finally, we evaluate the effect of ethnicity on labour market discrimination, by means of our pair-wise (OLS) regressions (1)-(3) reported in Table 5 . The equation's
(1) estimations show that the Greek candidates face a higher probability of being invited to an interview, which is a statistically significant outcome, in all occupations, at the 1% level (column 5). Moreover, the equation's (2) estimations show that the Greek candidates face a higher probability of being registered with IKA, which, apart from office jobs and shop sales, is statistically significant at the1% level (column 5).
Whilst, the equation's (3) estimations show that the Greek candidates are also offered higher wage contracts, which, apart from shop sales, is a statistically significant outcome at the 1% level (Column 5). 
Employers Elucidate Wage Discrimination
In this section we report the findings of our second experiment, conducted in order to evaluate to which extent the taste, statistical, and profit maximizationcompatible hypotheses, may consistently interpret our correspondence test's results regarding wage discrimination. For that experiment, we have utilized an indirect approach as follows.
Those employers who had invited both candidates for interview were telephoned, we told them that we are engaged in a research project, and they were asked to rationalize (if they wish so) the factors which were responsible for wage discrimination, already evidenced in their sector, by choosing among alternative (proposed) causations. Since the interviewed employers had themselves already decided the outcome of our correspondence test regarding wage discrimination, our aim at this instance was to implicitly make them bring in to light the scope of reasons they did so. Of course, our interviews were applied without revealing to employers either their participation in the correspondence test or in the current experiment.
Specifically, after we had introduced to them the "fact": based on a current university research conducted to your sector, regarding male Greeks and Albanians, having the same age, equal qualifications and experience, Albanians were found to face wage discrimination, employers were asked to confirm or not the following propositions (see, e.g., Appendix 2). In Table A (Appendix 2) we report the received probability results regarding proposition 1. While the "dislike" against Albanians is found to account for the 24.2%
(column 2), it had nothing to do with wage discrimination in all other (75.5%) cases (column 3). As tested by the criterion for differences in percentages, this difference is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level (column 4). In Table B (Appendix 2) we respectively report the probability results for Proposition 2. Although, based on our introductory "fact," Greeks and Albanians had equal human capital, there were still beliefs amongst employers (19.6%) that ambiguities' concerning Albanians' productivity can be a factor for wage discrimination (column 2). However, the employers' vast majority (84.3%) does not seem to believe that (column 3). This difference is similarly found to be statistically significant (column 4).
In Table C we report the probability results assigned for Proposition 3.
Interestingly, approximately three out of four employers (73.6%) seem to believe that wage discrimination is a firms' profit strategy, apart from what is entailed in propositions 2 (column 2). That difference as well found to be statistically significant (column 4).
In Table D we report the probability results concerning how employers (as they had effectively been asked to) weigh the three hypotheses/explanations of wage discrimination. Employers were found to "put the blame" on taste discrimination by 7.8% (column 1), on statistical discrimination by 9.6% (column 2), while their vast majority, on profit strategies by 84.4% (column 3). Focusing on the two most preferable, we have subsequently tested their significance. We conclude that profit strategies, rather than statistical discrimination, is the factor which employers accuse most for wage discrimination (column 4).
Last, but not least, in Table E we report the probability results concerning how employers weigh their second best choice. To that end, employers were found to "put the blame" on statistical discrimination, by 82.8% (column 2), on profit strategies, by 15.9% (column 3), and on taste discrimination, by only 2.4% (column 1). Hence, interestingly, the statistical hypothesis of wage discrimination was found to be the employers' (statistically significant) second best explanation (column 4). Moreover, for robustness, employers were asked by "how much" prefer their first best choice (Table D) , to their second best one (Table E) . Table F displays that the employers' vast majority (88.4%) prefers by "very much" their first best choice, while only 11.5% prefers it by "quite a lot," a difference which is also found to be statistically significant (Table 4) .
Conclusions
In January 2005 Greece adopted the two European anti-discrimination Directives. The purpose of those directives was to lay down a framework for combating discrimination, as regards employment and occupation, on the grounds of religion or beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Directives make clear that people affected by discrimination should have adequate means of legal protection and an effective right of redress in order to be able to get things put rights. Presumably, therefore, workplace equality has currently the backing of the law. However, a history of discrimination can't turn overnight. The law on its own can chance very little of it.
In this study we investigate the extent of ethnic discrimination in the labour market using field data. We have used correspondence testing to examine directly whether ethnic discrimination currently exists in the Greek labour market. In particular, we are interested in whether low skilled Albanians face discriminatory treatment compared to -equal human capital endowed-Greeks. In previous studies, field experiments have been also used to test for discrimination in hiring. In this paper, while we also focus on the hiring process, we have extended the scope of analysis by gathering information on insurance coverage registrations, as well as on wage offers. Moreover, we have conducted a second experiment, by indirectly asking those who are effectively deciding the discriminatory outcomes (i.e., the employers) to "put the blame" on particular reasons.
The conclusion of our both experiments is that ethnic discrimination in the Greek labour market is still significant. According to the International Labour Organization measurement standards, we have estimated that Albanians face 43.5% less chance of access to occupations. Moreover, concentrating on the 49.7% equal chance (of access to occupations) cases, we argue that Albanians face 36.5% less chance of being registered with insurance coverage, while their potential wage contracts are 8.8% below those of Greeks and 5.3% below the legal minimum wage.
Interestingly, employers themselves "put the blame" for that, on profit strategies (by 84.4%), on statistical discrimination (by 9.6%), and on taste discrimination (by 7.8%). 
